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Introduction 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the term "employees" in the Utah 
Public Transit District Act refers to supervisors, and therefore provides 
supervisors the right to bargain collectively. Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(2)(a). 
In the opening brief, UTA demonstrated that the Utah Legislattue in 1969 
used the term" employees" in the Utah Public Transit District Act to refer to the 
same class of workers who had collective bargaining rights under federal law. As 
the Utah Legislature put it, the Utah Public Transit District Act established only 
those "rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of 
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, ... as determined by 
the Secretary of Labor .... " Id. § 17B-2a-813(1). 
Because the Utah Public Transit District Act extended collective bargaining 
rights to those workers who had collective bargaining rights under federal law in 
1969, the issue before this court hinges upon whether supervisors had collective 
bargaining rights under federal law in 1969. And as UTA demonstrated in the 
opening brief, supervisors had no collective bargaining rights under federal law 
in 1969, and, therefore, supervisors have no collective bargaining rights under 
the Utah Public Transit District Act. This avoids what the district court 
recognized as the anomalous result that UTA supervisors "may very well be the 
only supervisors in the United States with the right to organize and collectively 
bargain." [R.287 at n.2.] 
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In the response brief, the Teamsters do not respond to this straightforward 
argument. Below is each point raised by the Teamsters and why it fails: 
• The Teamsters assert that the issue is moot. [Resp. Br. at 8-10.] But 
the district court order continues to allow the UT A supervisors to 
hold elections to attempt to unionize, a right they would not have if 
this court reverses. The issue is not moot. 
• The Teamsters assert that the Utah Public Transit District Act is state 
law, not federal law. [Resp. Br. at 12.] This is correct but beside the 
point. The Utah Legislature can enact a statute with the same scope 
as a federal statute. That is what happened here. 
• The Teamsters assert that the Utah Legislature has authority to 
provide more protection than federal law. [Resp. Br. at 14.] This is 
correct but also beside the point. While the Utah Legislature has 
authority to provide more protection, it did not do so here. 
In the opening brief, UTA next demonstrated-as an independent ground 
to reverse -that, even if the Utah Public Transit District Act uses the term 
"employees" as it is used in the Utah Labor Relations Act (''ULRA"), supervisors 
still have no right to bargain collectively. It is undisputed that the term 
11 employees" under the ULRA has the same meaning as that term had in the 
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). And while it was unclear for a number 
of years whether the NLRA provided collective bargaining rights to supervisors, 
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in 1947, in response to Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947), 
Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Amendments and clarified that the NLRA 
never provided collective bargaining rights to supervisors. 
Because the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947 operated as a clarification 
of the NLRA, rather than a substantive change to the NLRA, the NLRA has 
always excluded supervisors from its scope. And because the NLRA has always 
excluded supervisors from its scope, the ULRA also has always excluded 
supervisors from its scope. The clarification to federal law in 1947 informed the 
Utah Legislature that it did not need to amend the ULRA to exclude supervisors 
from its scope. Therefore, even if the Utah Public Transit District Act used the 
term "employees" as it is used in the ULRA, supervisors have no right to bargain 
collectively. 
In the response brief, the Teamsters do not respond to this straightforward 
argument either. Below is each point raised by the Teamsters and why it fails: 
• The Teamsters assert that UT A ignores controlling precedent by 
citing the dissenting opinion in Packard. [Resp. Br. at 22-23.] But 
Packard is not controlling. In clarifying the NLRA with the Taft-
Hartley Amendments, Congress stated that the dissenting opinion 
correctly held that the NLRA has never provided collective 
bargaining rights to supervisors. The dissenting opinion correctly 
articulates the law. 
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• The Teamsters assert that legislative history is irrelevant to 
interpreting unambiguous statutes. [Resp. Br. at 26-28.] This is 
correct but beside the point. Under federal law in 1947, the 
legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Amendments was relevant to 
determining whether those amendments clarified or changed the 
law. The test for whether a statute is clarifying under federal law 
looks to whether Congress considered it to be clarifying, which 
makes legislative history relevant. 
• The Teamsters assert that, under current Utah law, the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments would be deemed substantive changes, not clarifying 
amendments. [Resp. Br. at 29-30.] This is correct but beside the point. 
The question of whether the Taft-Hartley Amendments were 
clarifying is governed by federal law in 1947, not current Utah law. 
• The Teamsters assert that UTA's efforts to have the Utah Legislature 
fix the problem created by the district court's order undermines 
UT A's position on appeal. [Resp. Br. at 30.] But those efforts were 
premised upon the erroneous order, not the correct interpretation of 
the statute. The lobbying efforts are irrelevant to the merits on 
appeal, but they do confirm that the issue is hardly moot. 
This court should reverse. 
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Argument 
1. The Issue Presented Is Not Moot Because the District Court's Order 
Allows UTA Supervisors to Attempt to Unionize at Any Time 
The Teamsters assert that the issue is moot because the rail operations 
supervisors held a secret ballot election and voted not to unionize, and "[t]he 
Union's loss of the election ternunated the controversy between the parties." 
[Resp. Br. at 8.] The Teamsters also assert "[t]here is no current organizing 
campaign with the Rail Operations Supervisors." [Resp. Br. at 8.] 
But these statements do not render the issue moot. An issue is moot only 
"if the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants," meaning 
"the controversy is eliminated such that it renders the relief requested impossible 
or of no legal effect." State v. Steed, 2015 UT 76, iJ 6,357 P.3d 547 (alteration and 
internal quotation marks omitted). The Teamsters cannot demonstrate that the 
supervisors will not again attempt to unionize under the right to do so declared 
in the district court's order. [R.290,697-98.] 
In fact, under federal law the supervisors could attempt to unionize at any 
time: "[n]o election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision 
within which in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have 
been held." 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). Under Utah law, there are no restrictions on the 
frequency of a bargaining unit's holding an election. The supervisors' last 
election was held September 13, 2016. [R.675.] Under the district court's current 
ruling, the supervisors could hold another election any day. [R.277-78,294.] 
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Because the supervisors could attempt to unionize under the district 
court's order, the controversy between the parties remains alive. To state it 
plainly, if this court reverses the order of the district court, then the supervisors 
will not be allowed to initiate a new election to unionize. The requested relief, 
therefore, will affect the legal rights of the litigants. 
And the issue could not have become moot based upon the fact that the 
Teamsters are not currently pursuing an election. [Resp. Br. at 8.] The "voluntary 
cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to 
hear and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot." Cty. of Los 
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625,631 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Said 
differently, "a party should not be able to evade judicial review ... by 
temporarily altering questionable behavior." City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of 
Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278,284 n.1 (2001). Thus, "[w]hen a party moots a case by 
voluntarily changing its own conduct, [a court should] view mootness · 
arguments with suspicion because the offending party might otherwise resume 
that conduct as soon as the case is dismissed." N.M. ex rel. Richardson v. BLM, 565 
F.3d 683, 701 (10th Cir. 2009). 
This court continues to have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue presented 
on appeal because its decision will determine whether UTA supervisors continue 
to have the legal right to attempt to unionize. The issue presented is not moot. 
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2. The Utah Public Transit District Act Defines 11Employees" as Federal 
Labor Law Defined that Term in 1969 
In the opening brief, UTA first demonstrated that the Utah Legislature in 
1969 used the term "employees" in the Utah Public Transit District Act to refer to 
the same class of workers who then had collective bargaining rights under 
federal law. [Op. Br. at 11-17.] Because the Utah Public Transit District Act 
extended collective bargaining rights only to those workers who had collective 
bargaining rights under federal law in 1969, the issue before the court hinges 
upon whether supervisors had collective bargaining rights under federal law in 
1969. But it is undisputed that supervisors had no collective bargaining rights 
under federal law in 1969. Therefore, supervisors have no collective bargaining 
rights under the Utah Public Transit District Act. 
In response, the Teamsters assert that Utah labor law controls. [Resp. Br. at 
12-15.] On this point, all parties agree. As the Tenth Circuit noted in Burke v. 
Utah Transit Authority & Local 382, "the 'legislative history [of the Urban Mass 
Transit Act] indicates that eongress intended collective bargaining agreements to 
be governed by state law applied in state courts."' 462 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated 
Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 29 (1982)). UTA agrees. 
But the issue is not whether Utah law governs. It does. The issue is 
whether Utah law adopted a term used in federal law. Instead of looking to 
federal law for the meaning of "employees," however, the Teamsters assert that 
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the court should look only to a dictionary to conclude that an employee is any 
11 person who works for another person or business in return for salary, wages, or 
other compensation." [Resp. Br. at 16 (quoting The American Heritage Desk 
Dictionary).] The Teamsters' argument ignores the fact that, when interpreting a 
statute, this court gives II effect to the legislature's intent." Carranza v. United 
States, 2011 UT 80, ,r 8, 267 P.3d 912 (internal quotation marks omitted). And that 
intent is discerned not just from the isolated term in q dictionary definition, but 
that language in context. Olsen v. Eagle Mountain CihJ, 2011 UT 10, ,r 9 & n.3, 248 
P.3d465. 
In particular, when interpreting Utah statutes modeled on federal statutes, 
"[t]his Court has previously adopted federal interpretations for sections of the 
Utah Code which are identical to or copied after federal acts." W Coating, Inc. v. 
Gibbons & Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505-06 (Utah 1990). "A cardinal rule of statutory 
construction says that a legislature's use of an established legal term of art 
incorporates the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the 
body of learning from which it was taken." Utah Stream Access Coalition v. Orange 
St. Dev., 2017 UT 82, ,r 21, _ P.3d _ (internal quotation marks omitted). 
To interpret the Utah Public Transit District Act, then, this court should 
look to the Urban Mass Transportation Act on which the Utah statute is 
modeled. And as presented in UT A's opening brief, the Urban Mass Transit Act 
uses the same definitions as the NLRA in 1964. [Op. Br. at 11-19.] And the NLRA 
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in 1964 expressly excluded "supervisors" as "employees" for collective 
bargaining purposes. 
Furthermore, as argued in UT A's opening brief, the Utah Legislature and 
courts have distinguished between "employees" and "supervisors" as a subset of 
employers, in both workers compensation and collective bargaining settings. 
[Op. Br. at 45-51.] The Teamsters respond that Utah has adopted a broad 
definition of" employee," pointing to section 17B-2a-814 of the Utah Code and 
two cases. Neither section 17B-2a-814 nor the two cases change the result. 
Section 17B-2a-814 provides that "[e]ach trustee, officer, and employee of a 
public transit district is subject to the provisions of Title 67, Chapter 16, Utah 
Public Officers' and Employees' Ethics Act." The Ethics Act defines a public 
employee as "a person who is not a public who is employed on a full-time, part-
time, or contract basis," except for "legislators or legislative employees." Id. 
§ 67-16-3(12)(a). The same section defines "Legislative employee," "Legislator," 
and "Public officer." Id. § 67-16-3(9), (10), (13).-
The definitions in this section undercut the Teamsters' argument that the 
dictionary definition of employee should govern all statutory references to the 
term "employee." If there were no differences among individuals paid by the 
state, or its subdivisions, everyone would be an "employee." And just as the 
Ethics Act differentiates between classes of individuals paid by the state and its 
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subdivisions, Utah labor law and case law differentiates between employers and 
employees. [Op. Br. at 45-51.] Section 17B-2a-814 is beside the point. 
The two cases cited by the Teamsters are also off topic. First, Weber County-
Ogden City Relief Committee v. Industrial Commission of Utah was a workers' 
compensation case in which the court determined whether a worker hired and 
supervised by the city, but paid by the state's treasury, was a city employee. 71 
P.2d 177, 180-82 (Utah 1937). The issue was whether the employee was eligible 
for workers' compensation. The workers' compensation act includes a broad 
definition of "employee" to protect every worker who might be injured or killed 
in the course of employment. Id. at 183. For that reason, that act includes 
everyone, even the Governor: 
[The statute] defines the words "employee," 
"workman," and "operative" to mean: "(1) Every 
elective and appointive officer, and every other person, 
in the service of the state, or of any county, city, town or 
district board of education within the state, serving the 
state, county, city, town or district board of education 
therein under any election or appointment, or under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, written or 
oral." 
Id. at 183-84.1 But unlike the statutes governing workers' compensation, the Utah 
Public Transit District Act distinguishes among employees. And because 
employees are distinguished from employers for purposes of collective 
bargaining, the broadest possible definition of employee cannot apply. 
1 The statute has some limitations, excluding employers with fewer than three 
employees and independent contractors. Utah Code§ 42-1-40 (1933). 
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Second, the Teamsters' reliance on Palmer v. Davis is unavailing. 808 P.2d 
128 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). This is another workers' compensation case. 
Ms. Palmer's minor son was injured by a co-worker while working as a ranch 
hand. Id. at 130-31. Ms. Palmer had signed a release of claims against other 
employees, but argued that the release did not preclude her claim against the co-
worker because the co-worker was not an employee. Id. at 130. The court of 
appeals qisagreed and held that the co-worker was an ~mployee. Id. In doing so, 
it also relied on the broadest definition of II employee." 
Id. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines the word "employee" as 
11 [a] person in the service of another under any contract 
of hire, express or implied, oral or written, where the 
employer has the power or right to control and direct 
the employee in the material details of how the work is 
performed." Black's Law Dictionary 471 (5th ed. 1979). 
This definition was echoed by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423, 
426 (Utah 1980), in which the court stated that 11 [i]n 
general, it can be said that an employee is one who is 
hired for compensation, for a substantial period of time, 
to perform duties wherein he is subject to a 
comparatively high degree of direction and control by 
the one who hires him." 
The Teamsters' use of these broad definitions from other statutes ignores 
the different context relevant to the interpretation of the Utah Public Transit 
District Act. Workers' compensation protects all workers, whether they be the 
president or the receptionist. As explained in the opening brief, labor relations 
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statutes distinguish between management and those workers they manage, i.e., 
employees and employers. [Op. Br. at 45-51.] 
When the court interprets the Utah Public Transit District Act in context, 
supervisors are not employees with collective bargaining rights.2 In that Act, the 
Utah Legislature extended to public transit workers only those rights they then 
had under federal law. It is undisputed that supervisors lacked collective 
bargaining rights under federal law in 1969. Thus, the Utah Public Transit 
District Act did not extend collective bargaining rights to supervisors. This court 
should reverse. 
3. The Utah Public Transit District Act Does Not Adopt the Definition of 
"Employees" in the ULRA, but Even if It Did, the Result Is the Same 
The Teamsters argue that this court should look to the ULRA - not the 
Urban Mass Transportation Act and the NLRA- to interpret the Utah Public 
Transit District Act. [Resp. Br. at 20.] For reasons outlined above, the Utah Public 
Transit District Act unambiguously adopts the same definition of "employees" as 
that term had under federal labor law in 1969. And at that time, federal labor law 
unambiguously excluded supervisors from the definition of "employees." 
2 In passing, the Teamsters assert that the rail operations supervisors have a 
first amendment right to organize and participate in a labor union. [Resp. Br. at 
18.] The cases they cite note that there is not an affirmative obligation on the 
government to listen to, respond to, or recognize the organization. The 
Teamsters, however, argue that section 17B-2a-813(2)(c)(i) requires UTA to 
bargain with any labor organization that represents a majority of employees in a 
particular unit. This is a circular argument that assumes the Teamsters are correct 
about the very issue before the court-i.e., whether supervisors are "employees." 
The First Amendment assertions add nothing to the arguments before the court. 
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But even if the Utah Public Transit District Act adopted the definition in 
the ULRA, the Teamsters recognize that, because the ULRA was patterned on the 
NLRA, this court should look to the NLRA to understand the ULRA. [Resp. Br. 
at 21-22.] The Teamsters accuse UTA of relying on "dubious legislative history 
and minority opinions" in interpreting the NLRA, [Resp. Br. at 23], when in fact 
UT A is providing a more complete history of the NLRA. 
First, Teamsters accuse UTA of "ignor[ing] the majority opinion" and 
focusing only on the dissent in Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 
(1947). [Resp. Br. at 23.] But in its opening brief, UTA presented a full description 
of the majority opinion in Packard. [Op. Br. at 26-27.] UTA also described the 
arguments of the dissent. [Op. Br. at 27-28.] 
The Teamsters fail to recognize that UTA uses the dissent to "justify [its] 
position," [Resp. Br. at 23], because it was the dissent' s interpretation of the term 
"employee" that Congress described as the correct interpretation in the Taft-
Hartley Amendments to the NLRA. Pub L. No. 80-101, 61. Stat. 136 (1947). That 
is, the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified that Congress never intended to define 
"employees" to include supervisors, just as Justice Douglas suggested in his 
dissent.3 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (Supp. 1 (1947)) (original codification of Taft-
Hartley Amendments to the NLRA excluding supervisors from definition of 
3 Congress moved to clarify Packard almost immediately after its release. [Op. 
Br. at 29.] The Taft-Hartley Amendments were codified-over President 
Truman's veto-only three-and-one-half months later. [Op. Br. at 34.] 
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"employee"), with Packard, 330 U.S. at 499 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ( explaining 
that Congress did not intend to include supervisors in the definition of 
"employee"). The majority opinion in Packard is not controlling. 
The Teamsters next assert that the majority position in Packard-that 
supervisors are "employees" - applies to the interpretation of the ULRA because 
courts before and since Packard have interpreted the term "employee" to have 
"no limit." [Resp. Br. at 23-24.] But the cases cited by Teaµ,.sters are inapposite. 
NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1940), and 
American Steel Foundries v. NLRB, 158 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1946) both predate and 
are consistent with Packard. Their analyses of the term II employee" are not 
particularly meaningful given Congress' clarification in response to Packard in 
the Taft-Hartley Amendments. As a result, neither case informs the question of 
how to interpret II employee" under the ULRA. 
The post-Packard case cited by the Teamsters is also unhelpful because it 
does not concern supervisors. The Teamsters claim that NLRB v. Town & Country 
Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995), "acknowledged the appropriateness of the 
expansive definition of employees under the Wagner Act." [Resp. Br. at 24.] But 
Town & Country did not concern supervisors, but instead addressed the question 
of whether a worker could be a company's "employee" if that worker was paid 
by a union to help the union organize. 516 U.S. at 87-88. In finding that such a 
worker could be an employee, the court cited Packard in a string cite of cases 
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supporting the proposition that the court had historically given the NLRA's 
definition of" employee" "a broad, literal reading." Id. at 91-92. The same string 
cite noted that the NLRA had been amended "to overrule ... Packard by 
explicitly excluding ... supervisory employees." Id. at 92. Town & Country has 
nothing to do with supervisors. 
The Teamsters' final errors in interpreting the NLRA arise in their 
argument that the Taft-Hartley Amendments did not clarify the NLRA. [Resp. 
Br. at 26-32.] Specifically, the Teamsters argue that "a Court must find the 
statutory language ambiguous" before considering legislative history. [Resp. Br. 
at 26.] And because the language of the NLRA is II unambiguous," UT A's 
arguments regarding the import of the Taft-Hartley Amendments should be 
rejected. [Resp. Br. at 26.] But like the district court, the Teamsters fail to 
recognize that UT A does not rely on legislative history, but on subsequent 
legislation in arguing that the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified that Congress 
did not intend supervisors to be II employees" in the NLRA. UT A made this clear 
in the opening brief. [Op. Br. at 36-39.] 
The Teamsters also assert that 11 [n]othing in the actual language of the Taft 
Hartley amendments indicate that it was intended to clarify the Wagner Act." 
[Resp. Br. at 27.] But as UTA demonstrated in its opening brief, the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments qualify as clarifying amendments under the federal standard at the 
time for determining whether legislation is clarifying. [Op. Br. at 42-44.] Under 
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that standard, it is enough that the legislative history of that amendment 
indicates an intent to clarify, as the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments does: "[B]y this bill, Congress makes clear once more what it tried 
to make clear when, in passing the act, it defined as an' employer,' not an 
'employee,' any person' acting in the interest of an employer .... "' H. R. Rep. 
No. 80-245, at 308 (1947). The Teamsters' assertion that the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments amended the language of the NLRA is beside the point. [Resp. Br. 
at 27.] Of course the Taft-Hartley Amendments amended the NLRA. The issue is 
whether the amendments clarified or announced a substantive change in the law. 
Under the federal test, they clarified. 
The Teamsters also assert that the Taft-Hartley Amendments could not 
have been clarifying because "Congress waited until 1947 to alter the definition 
of 'employees.111 [Resp. Br. at 28.] They claim that "[w]hat prompted Congress to 
change the definition of 'employee' wasn't the Supreme Court's decision in 
Packard," but "the election of 1946 which resulted in the Democratic Party losing 
control of Congress for the first time in 16 years." [Resp. Br. at 28.] The Teamsters 
offer no support for this assertion, and it is in direct contradiction to the 
circumstances surrounding the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments and 
contemporaneous statements by members of Congress. 
The NLRA was enacted in 1935. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449. At the 
time of its passage and immediately thereafter, the NLRB generally excluded 
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supervisors from bargaining units. [Op. Br. at 24-25.] Thereafter, the NLRB began 
interpreting the NLRA inconsistently, sometimes including supervisors as 
11 employees," and, at other times, excluding them.4 [Op. Br. at 25-26.] When the 
United States Supreme Court finally spoke on the issue in Packard and held that 
supervisors were "employees" under the NLRA, Congress responded 
immediately with the Taft-Hartley Amendments. As Senator Taft explained, "[i]t 
was not until 1945, after several changes in position, that the National Labor 
Relations Board itself by divided vote finally decided that supervisory 
employees were covered by the [NLRA]. This construction was recently upheld 
by the Supreme Court in the Packard Motor Car case." S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 409-
10 (1947). It is therefore Packard, not some change in the political makeup of 
Congress, that spurred Congress to clarify the NLRA with the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments. 
The Teamsters also assert that the "use of subsequent legislation [in 
interpreting a statute] has also been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court." [Resp. 
Br. at 29.] UTA addressed this argument in its opening brief, admitting that 
clarifying amendments are not controlling under Utah law. [Op. Br. at 40.] As 
4 The United States Supreme Court in Packard recognized the confusion. 
Remarking on the "long record of inaction, vacillation and division of the 
[NLRB] in applying [the NLRA] to foremen," the court said, "[i]f we were 
obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in finding the 
meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of the Board's decisions would leave us 
in the dark." 330 U.S. at 492. 
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UTA explained, because the ULRA is copied from a federal law (the NLRA), and 
this court looks to that federal law to interpret the state law, federal law controls 
whether subsequent federal legislation (the Taft-Hartley Amendments) informs 
the interpretation of the NLRA. [Op. Br. at 40.] If the clarifying amendment at 
issue were a Utah state statute, Teamsters would be correct. But the clarifying 
amendment at issue is a federal statute, and under federal law, clarifying 
amendments are meaningful and apply retroactively. United States v. Montgomery 
Cty., 761 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[C]hanges in statutory language need 
not ipso facto constitute a change in meaning or effect. Statutes may be passed 
purely to make what was intended all along even more unmistakably clear."). 
Finally, the Teamsters assert that the clarified meaning of "employee" does 
not apply to the ULRA because "[k]nowing that the definition of employee 
under the Wagner Act included supervisors, the Utah Legislature declined to 
provide a 'clarifying amendment' such as Congress did with the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments." [Resp. Br. at 29.] But the Teamsters fail to acknowledge that, after 
the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified federal law, Utah had no reason to 
amend the ULRA to clarify that supervisors are not "employees." No Utah court 
had interpreted the ULRA as the Packard majority interpreted the NLRA, so the 
Utah Legislature had no need to clarify a state statute whose federal counterpart 
had been clarified. Moreover, as UT A explained in the opening brief, Utah courts 
consistently distinguished supervisors from employees when interpreting Utah 
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labor laws before the ULRA was enacted, after the ULRA was enacted (but 
before the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified the NLRA), and after the Taft-
Hartley Amendments were enacted. [Op. Br. at 45-47.] 
Conclusion 
The district court erred in its interpretation of the term "[e]mployee" in 
section 17B-2a-813(2)(a) of the Utah Public Transit District Act.5 This court should 
vacate summary judgment and remand for the court to resolve the fact question 
of whether UT A's rail operations supervisors are supervisors for purposes of 
collective bargaining. This court should also instruct the district court, if 
necessary, to order a secret ballot election rather than a card check. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 2018. 
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34-20-2 of the Utah Code as the relevant statute. (Op. Br. at 56.) UTA should have 
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